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Résumé en
anglais
In this paper, I show that Polleit and Mariano (2011) are right in concluding that
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are per se unobjectionable from Rothbard’s libertarian
perspective on property rights and contract theory, but that they fail to derive this
conclusion properly. I therefore outline the proper explanation. In addition, though
Polleit and Mariano are correct in pointing out that speculation with CDS can
conceivably hurt the borrowers’ interests, they fail to grasp that this can be the case
only in some peculiar circumstances that I identify. In other words, they miss the
bigger picture, the one outside special circumstances, in which CDS trading has the
opposite effect. That is, CDS facilitate debt accumulation, including government debt
accumulation. Finally, I point out how this can precipitate the collapse of fiat money
regimes. An incidental goal of the analysis is to provide a better account than Polleit
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